research papers and journal articles
2024. “The View from Jakarta: Friends with benefits, not fellow fighters”, Australian Foreign Affairs, Jun 7, 2024
Abstract:
Indonesia ultimately sees Australia as a valuable provider of a specific set of defence needs – from education and training to combined exercises critical for readiness – and as a joint partner for a limited number of shared security challenges, such as illegal fishing or counterterrorism. Indonesia is unlikely ever to see Australia – or any other country, for that matter – as a future fellow war- fighter against China.
2023. “Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants”, International Affairs 99 (4): 1371-1381 (Introduction to a special section co-edited with Kanti Bajpai)
Abstract:
How do Asian states regard the present liberal international order (LIO)? To what extent do they agree with each other? Would they modify or radically change the current order? What are the implications for policy-makers around the world? The special section presented here comprises a set of articles by Asian scholars based in Asia, who live and breathe their countries’ international relations, to address these questions.
2023. “The Philippines’ Surprising Veer West”, Survival, 65 (3): 81-89 (with James Crabtree)
Abstract:
The stark nature of Manila’s shift invites comparison to other pronounced recent changes in national-security orientation, such as Japan’s more assertive foreign and security policy in response to Chinese military expansion and Germany’s Zeitenwende in response to Russia’s war with Ukraine. It is tempting to attribute the shift largely to China’s coercive behaviour. But three other factors are also at work. Firstly, Marcos has proven to be instinctively pro-American. Secondly, the AFP have generally supported the US alliance and been wary of rapprochement with China. Marcos has given his military’s views more weight, allowing it to move forward with enhanced connections with Washington to facilitate defence modernisation. Finally, sensing opportunity and increasingly aware of the Philippines’ geographic importance in any future conflict with China over Taiwan, the US has simply worked harder to engage Manila.
2022. Charting their own course: How Indonesians see the world. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2022 (with Ben Bland and Natasha Kassam)
Abstract:
With Indonesia seeking to play a larger role on the global stage, and many outside powers hoping to woo Southeast Asia’s largest country, there is a pressing need to better understand how its people see the world and themselves in a changing international environment.The Indonesia Poll 2021 — Charting their own course, conducted a decade after the Lowy Institute’s last poll in the country, is based on fieldwork carried out in December 2021. The survey consists of a nationally representative sample of some 3000 Indonesians aged 17 to 65 across 33 provinces of Indonesia.
2020. “Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific”, The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3 (5): 106-117
Abstract:
Why has Southeast Asia been particularly lukewarm to the idea of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad)? If Japan, India, Australia, and the United States collectively work under the Quad to confront China, Southeast Asia’s biggest and most difficult strategic challenge, should not the region embrace and support the Quad? This article seeks to answer these questions by examining the different Southeast Asian views on the Quad. It further examines whether and how the Quad leaders could gradually develop mechanisms to induce a strategic buy-in from Southeast Asia. I argue in particular that the Quad should not reinvent the wheel in terms of regional architecture building and instead seek to become a “strategic filler” for and a “strategic amplifier” to existing ASEAN-led mechanisms and institutions. Furthermore, as far as Southeast Asians are concerned, the idea of the Quad boosting ASEAN institutions is perhaps more appealing than expanding the Quad into a “Quad Plus” by inviting, for example, South Korea, New Zealand, Brazil, Israel, and Vietnam. The key to a future Quad–ASEAN relationship therefore lies in finding a calibrated partnership based on shared principles and interests as well as practical cooperative engagements.
2018. "Abandoned at Sea: The Tribunal Ruling and Indonesia's Missing Archipelagic Foreign Policy", Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2: pp. 300-321 (with Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto)
Abstract:
Indonesia's response to the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal ruling was underwhelming, even as a nonclaimant in the South China Sea disputes. Given its maritime geography and interests, the response is symptomatic of the country's underdevelopment of an “archipelagic foreign policy”—one where the entire foreign policy system, from its bureaucracy, doctrine, and strategy, should be geared to secure and defend its external maritime interests. This article further argues that the authoritarian New Order regime (1966–1998) repressed the development of an archipelagic foreign policy in two ways: (1) the army‐dominated foreign policy establishment deprioritized external maritime interests and (2) the infusion of the National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional) concept into the “Archipelagic Outlook” (Wawasan Nusantara) doctrine as a regime maintenance tool further “domesticated” what could have been a geopolitical outlook. These authoritarian legacies put Indonesia's foreign policy on a path‐dependent trajectory that even President Joko Widodo's Global Maritime Fulcrum could not break.
2016. "The Domestic Politics of Indonesia's Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and the South China Sea", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38 (3): pp. 382-388
Abstract:
This article argues that Indonesia’s inconsistency should be placed within the deeper and broader historical ambivalence embedded in the bilateral relationship with China and in Indonesia’s awkward non-claimant position, as well as the country’s chaotic domestic maritime security governance. These permissive (or antecedent) conditions, however, are necessary but insufficient to explain Indonesia’s lukewarm response to the ruling. This article argues that President Jokowi’s lack of personal interest and grasp of foreign policy provides the more proximate (or triggering) condition behind the response. Specifically, his aloofness has led to deteriorating bureaucratic politics and the growing influence of a small number of advisers outside of the foreign ministry — a “foreign policy oligarchy” if you will — in the formulation of the country’s China policy.
2011. “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter?“, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33 (2): pp. 157 – 182
Abstract:
This paper seeks to challenge the view that Indonesia’s geographical and population size account for its rising regional and global profile. Instead, it makes three inter-related arguments. First, the manifestations of Indonesia’s foreign policy and global profile have always been based on its ability to harness the country’s normative and moral voice. Second, while democratization since 1998 has allowed Indonesia to restore its reputation in world affairs and provided it with a new source of “soft power”, it has also complicated foreign policy-making. Third, Indonesia’s large geographical size and population have been a source of persistent internal security threats, and because the government has been unable to meet national defence requirements, the growth in its defence diplomacy activities reflect the country’s continuing strategic weakness rather than its strength
2011. “Variations on a Theme: Dimensions of Ambivalence in Indonesia-China Relations,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 13 (1): pp. 24-31
Abstract:
Is Indonesia finally joining the Chinese bandwagon? Upon taking a closer look at the evolution in the bilateral relations, however, the answer to this question is not so straightforward. Indeed, the picture of Indonesia’s policy towards China is not a simple question of hedging, balancing, band-wagoning, or some variation of the three — though many analyses of Southeast Asian responses to China’s rise focus on these specific strategies. This paper argues instead that, when located within the broader evolution of Indonesia-China relations, Jakarta’s policy towards China is that of persistent ambivalence and ambiguity. This paper aims to explain the ambivalence in Indonesia–China relations by assessing its four main dimensions: domestic politics, economics, strategic and security, and regional and foreign policy. These dimensions of ambivalence largely originate from deep-rooted sentiments and from the perceptions of the Indonesian public and elite, which are in turn shaped by a long history of mutual interaction, the place of ethnic Chinese-Indonesians in Indonesian society, as well as by China’s geographic proximity.
2011. “The Enduring Strategic Trinity: Explaining Indonesia’s Geopolitical Architecture,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 7 (1): pp. 95-116
Abstract:
This paper seeks to describe and assess the geopolitical architecture of Indonesia as the largest archipelagic state in the world. It makes two main inter-related arguments. First, Indonesia’s geographical traits suggest that it could be both a source of weakness and vulnerability as much as it brings enormous potential for political, economic, and even military power. Second, the historical origins and conceptual foundations of ‘geopolitics’ as a policy theme suggest that Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture is based on three building blocks the ‘strategic trinity’: geostrategy (the military and security dimensions), geoeconomics (the resource and economic dimensions), and geopolitics (the social and political dimensions). While these arguments are not novel in themselves, this paper represents among the first attempts to systematically analyse and assess Indonesia’s geographical traits and how they shape the country’s strategic thinking, foreign policy, and national security system. The paper will also consider how Indonesia’s geopolitical architecture could help explain the country’s resurgent interest in the Indian Ocean Region in recent years.
Book chapters
2022. “Fracturing architecture? The Quad Plus and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific”, in Quad Plus and Indo-Pacific: The Changing Profile of International Relations, eds. Jagannath P. Panda and Ernest Gunasekara-Rockwell. Routledge, 2022, pp. 111-123
Abstract:
Will South-east Asian states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) embrace the expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, into a Quad Plus arrangement by adding South Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand, Brazil, and possibly others? What are the trade-offs of pushing for a Quad Plus and will it alter the broader regional security architecture? This chapter provides several answers to these questions.
2018. “Indonesia” in Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific, ed. Jeff Smith. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 67-81
Abstract:
The Non-Aligned philosophy is so deeply ingrained in Indonesia's foreign policy thinking that the country has eschewed formal alliances altogether. Even efforts to develop security partnerships short of alliances, especially with major powers like the United States and China, are closely scrutinized and can quickly generate domestic political oppositions for any administration in Jakarta. These broad contours of Indonesia's foreign policy help us better locate Indonesia's relationship with China within its broader political and historical contexts.
Book available here for purchase.
2018. "Drifting Towards Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy Under Yudhoyono", in Aspirations with Limitations: Indonesia's Foreign Affairs under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ed. Ulla Fionna, Siwage Dharma Negara, Deasy Simandjuntak. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 153-175
Abstract:
This chapter examines Indonesia's South China Sea policy under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. For much of his administration (2004-14), Indonesia held on to three inter-related polic y concepts: non-claimant, honest broker, and confidence-builder. This chapter explores the broader strategic contexts underpinning these concepts and consider how Yudhoyono followed the footsteps of his predecessors in responding to the developments in the South China Sea.
Book available here for purchase (incl. chapter PDFs)
2017. "Pragmatic Equidistance: How Indonesia Manages its Great Power Relations", in China, the United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia, ed. David Denoon. New York, NY: New York University Press, pp. 113-135
Abstract:
This chapter describes the rationale and nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and China. It places Indonesia’s foreign policy pertaining to these two countries within the broader context of Jakarta’s overall management of its great power relations. I argue that Indonesia’s approach can be described as one of ‘pragmatic equidistance’. As an approach to great power management, pragmatic equidistance captures the idea of fully engaging one great power in various forms of cooperation — from economic to defense matters — while simultaneously maintaining both strategic autonomy and keeping equal balance with other great powers.
The book has been reviewed by Contemporary Southeast Asia and China Report.