Journal articles
2022. “Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?”, Asia Policy 17 (4): 35-42
Abstract:
In examining the development of minilaterals anchored in Southeast Asia, this essay considers whether and, if so, how this subregion could contribute to broader capabilities to deter military aggression. "e essay argues that Southeast Asia’s experience with minilateralism is much more limited, focused, and functionally driven by specific security challenges such as armed robbery. It is unlikely that Southeast Asian states will be comfortable with a broader minilateral arrangement involving extraregional powers designed to deter China or sideline existing mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For better or worse, a more limited and functionally driven minilateralism gives Southeast Asian states more control over the direction, scope, and quality of cooperation. As well, analysts from the subregion have warned of the possibility that Indo-Pacifc minilateral arrangements could become platforms for major powers to extend their influence.
2022. “Remodelling Indonesia’s Maritime Law Enforcement Architecture: Theoretical and Policy Considerations”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 44 (1): 122-149
Abstract:
Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelagic state, tends to punch below its weight in regional maritime affairs. Part of the explanation for this puzzle lies in Indonesia’s under-developed and ineffective maritime governance system. This article seeks to develop ways to overhaul Indonesia’s maritime governance by focusing on one specific but potentially strategic area: maritime law enforcement in the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The article analyses the institutional challenges surrounding Indonesia’s EEZ maritime law enforcementand develops theoretical models and policy options drawn from the experiences of other Asian maritime states. It argues that Indonesia needs to move from its current “division of labour” model, where there are multiple agencies with multiple tasks, to a “unified command” model, where different maritime assets are unified under a single operational command. The article suggests that Indonesia should consider a “dual agency” architecture where the Indonesian Navy and the Maritime Security Agency become the two primary EEZ maritime law enforcement authorities. The article aims to contribute to broader debates surrounding maritime security governance and Indonesia’s future trajectory as a maritime power in the Indo-Pacific.
2021. “A Fragile Fulcrum: Indonesia-U.S. Military Relations in the Age of Great-Power Competition,” Asia Policy 16 (4): 106-114
Abstract:
Can the United States change Indonesia’s strategic alignment in the ongoing great-power competition in the Indo-Paci5c? More than a few analysts and policymakers in Washington and Jakarta might think so. For some, the people-to-people, economic, and security ties that have been built over seven decades of engagement should be stronger than Indonesia’s ties with China, which only restarted in 1990. But for others, given the scale of Indonesia’s economic engagement with China in recent years, the United States might have no choice but to rely on its relationship with the Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), to stay close to the island nation. In the areas of military education and training, joint exercises, and arms transfers, Indonesia’s relationship with the United States far outstrips the one it has with China
2020. “Indonesia and Anti-Access Warfare: Preliminary Policy Thoughts”, The Indonesian Quarterly 48 (4): 303-321
Abstract:
Why should Indonesia pay serious attention to the idea of anti-access warfare, the potential military conflict between great powers seeking to prevent or gain access near, into, or within a strategically contested geographic space? This paper offers preliminary answers to this question based on two arguments. First, anti-access warfare is at the heart of Indonesia’s deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific; it might even shape how a regional conflict will emerge. Second, Indonesia needs to develop its own anti-access strategy given its archipelagic geostrategic character and the centrality of its waterways and airspace in a future regional conflict. I provide both theoretical and practical reasons for the adoption of anti-access as Indonesia’s post-Minimum Essential Force strategic theory. Overall, the paper provides various policy considerations for why and how Indonesian strategic analysts should study and debate anti-access warfare further.
2019. “Reshuffling the Deck? Military Corporatism, Promotional Logjams and Post-Authoritarian Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 49 (5): pp. 806-836
Abstract:
This article seeks to explain the increasingly regressive (or illiberal) behaviour on the part of the Indonesian military. It focuses on the expansion of the Army’s Territorial Command structure, the growing military intrusion into civilian polity and the stunted progress of military professionalism. It provides an organisational, rather than political, perspective. Conceptually, the article synthesises various approaches to comparative politics to explain why and how military personnel policies affect political behaviour. Empirically, using a series of original datasets of hundreds of officers, the article demonstrates how promotional logjams – too many officers but too few positions available – over the past decade help explain the regressive behaviours we recently witnessed. It is further argued that the lack of institutionalisation in personnel policies gave rise to and prolonged these logjams. This article draws attention to the importance of intra-organisational dynamics in understanding the state of civil–military relations in post-authoritarian Indonesia
2019. “Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding”, Asia Policy 14 (4): pp. 63-71
Abstract:
This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998–99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first.
2017. "Threats and civil-military relations: Explaining Singapore's "trickle down" military innovation", Defense and Security Analysis, 33 (4): pp. 347-365
Abstract:
This article explains why Singapore, despite its small size and semi-authoritarian regime, retains one of the best military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It unpacks Singapore's ability to continuously innovate since the 1960s--technologically, organizationally, and conceptually--and even recently joined the Revolution in Military Affairs bandwagon. Drawing from the broader military innovation studies literature, this article argues evolutionary peacetime military innovation is more likely to occur in a state with a unified civil- military relation and whose military faces a high-level diverse set of threats. This argument explains how the civil-military fusion under the People’s Action Party-led government since Singapore's founding moment has been providing coherent and consistent strategic guidance, political support, and financial capital, allowing the Singapore Armed Forces to continuously innovate in response to high levels and diversity of threats
2012. “Regional Order by Other Means? Assessing the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Asian Security 8 (3): pp. 251–270
Abstract:
This article seeks to address why and how defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia has risen in the past decade. By examining multilateral defense diplomacy under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as Indonesia’s bilateral defense diplomacy, this article makes three arguments. First,bilateral and multilateral defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia complement one another. Second, the focus of multilateral defense diplomacy has evolved and now reflects the blurring distinction between nontraditional and traditional security issues. Third, the rise of ARF’s multilateral defense diplomacy can be attributed to the concern over China’s rise, while ASEAN, considers it as among the key mechanisms to recover from the fallout of the 1996 Asian financial crisis and the recent regional arms development.
2011. “Double Jeopardy: Climate Insecurities and Their Implications for Asian Armed Forces,” Defence Studies 11 (2): pp. 271 – 296
Abstract:
This paper seeks to explore and assess the implications of climate insecurities for armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular Southeast Asia. It identifies key issues and trends related to climate insecurities – in the areas of mass migration, diseases, natural disasters and the scarcity of water, food and other resources. It then details the implications for regional armed forces in the strategic, institutional and operational realms, and contends that climate change will become both a burden multiplier and a threat multiplier in the decades to come
2010. "Dari ‘Reformasi Militer’ Menuju ‘Transformasi Pertahanan’: Tantangan dan Prospek ke Depan", [From Military Reform to Defense Transformation: Prospects and Challenges Ahead], Indonesian Review, Vol. 1: pp. 1 – 12
Abstract:
Tulisan ini akan menunjukan bahwa selama satu dekade terakhir, capaian-capaian signifikan dalam reformasi TNI lebih terfokus pada persoalan peran sosio-politik militer, legislasi pertahanan, perluasan agenda keamanan (hingga reformasi Polri dan intelijen), dan sebagian persoalan anggaran dan teknologi pertahanan. Sementara itu, sebagian besar aspek-aspek kebijakan personil, pendidikan dan pelatihan, ekonomi pertahanan, basis teknologi dan inovasi, postur dan Tata Yudha (Orders of Battle) serta persoalan doktrinal, operasional, and kepangkatan masih hampir belum tersentuh
2009. "Rethinking Political Supremacy in War: A Review Essay of Clausewitz and Huntington", Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, 34 (4): pp. 57 – 66
Abstract:
This review article is meant to unlock the traditional foundation of civil-military relations, i.e. political supremacy, expressed in Huntington’s work. This would mainly be done by reviewing the thinking of Clausewitz on political supremacy, whom Huntington drew his philosophical foundation from. This article argues that first, Clausewitz’s Trinitarian concept of war--hostility, chance, political purpose--does not portray policy as more dominant than the other tendencies; instead, it presents them as equals, stressing only each one’s uniqueness in relation to the others. Second, Huntington’s misinterpretation of On War might have resulted from his use of a 1943 faulty translation of the book, coupled with his political ideology and inclinations to solve the problems facing the US at that time
This article is included in the online Clausewitz Bibliography compiled by Christopher Bassford.
2009. “Molding a Strategic and Professional Indonesian Military: Policy Options for the Next Administration”, The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August): pp. 352-363
Abstract
This article addresses the strategic gap between Indonesia's increasingly complex domestic, regional, and global security environment, and the country's inability to fully reform its national military generally known as the Indonesian Defense Forces or TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). Furthermore, while not neglecting the vast literature on Indonesia's military reform, as well as key reform policies, this article looks at two fundamental problems-the military's education and training system, and the strength of the civilian defense community that must be addressed if we wish to create a strategic and professional military, one that could tackle the country's increasingly complex security environment without usurping basic democratic principles in the long-run. This article also suggests that the President himself, instead of the Defense Minister, should be directly and personally involved in pushing any reform policies within those two areas. Finally, this article tries to move away from the current Security Sector Reform (SSR) parlance and discourse that has thus focused on the military's politics, business, and accountability-and their accompanying regulations.
2008. "Strategic Theory, Clausewitz, and the Indonesian Military", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 86 - 106
Abstract
This article suggest that we should start focusing on how to professionalize the Indonesian military by 're-militarizing' them, since the utter focus on 'de-politicization' and 'defense management' has appeared to have left out the need for 'capacity building' among the military professionals. One place to start is perhaps in the realm of strategic theory. The core theme here is that education in strategic theory is not simply focused on telling the military and civilians about what to think, but how to think strategically when we deal with the use, or threatened use, of military force amidst the increasingly complex strategic landscape. In addition, this article will also review the thinking of Carl Von Clausewitz, considered to be the founder of modem strategic thought. Finally, we hope to ascertain the significance of strategic theory, the relevance of CIausewitz, and perhaps draw lessons for Indonesia.
Short monograph
2018. Reinforcing Indonesia–Australia defence relations: The case for maritime recalibration, Lowy Analysis. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
Abstract:
Indonesia and Australia are increasingly important strategic anchors in the Indo-Pacific region, as recognised by the recently announced Indonesia–Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Yet historically, bilateral defence ties between the two countries have been volatile. This Analysis makes the case for a maritime recalibration of Australia’s defence engagement activities with Indonesia to stabilise defence relations. The process of recalibrating defence relations, however, cannot proceed in a historical vacuum. The evolution of Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with Indonesia since the 1960s is examined in order to understand how the relationship could be recalibrated. Three broad changes to DCP activities are recommended: reform existing DCP education and training programs to focus on joint maritime challenges; formulate long-term plans for the ‘conventional’ modernisation of the TNI, including tri-service integration, maritime security operations, and defence industrial collaboration; and increase maritime-related exercises, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and consider joint TNI–ADF exercises built around challenges in the maritime domain.
Note: The figures and graphs are better viewed and downloaded from the web version here.
Book chapters
2021. “Missing Pillars of Strategic Autonomy? Security Cooperation Between Korea and ASEAN”, in The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward, eds. Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, pp. 180-203 (with Andrew Mantong)
Abstract:
This paper seeks to examine the potential areas of security cooperation between the Republic of Korea (hereinafter, Korea) and ASEAN. It provides an assessment of whether and how Korea can work with ASEAN to strengthen regional security and peace. Specifically, we focus on two policy domains: maritime security and defense industrial collaboration. These two areas, we submit, are significant features of Southeast Asian countries’ quest for strategic autonomy amidst the growing strategic flux in the Indo-Pacific. By strategic autonomy, we mean the ability to independently define and defend their own strategic interests and foreign policy goals free from the dictates of other external powers.
2019. “Apakah Indonesia masih butuh Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (RSK)?” dalam Involusi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia. Jakarta: Imparsial, pp. 155-168
Abstrak:
Apakah Indonesia masih memerlukan Reformasi Sektor Keamanan? Epilog ini akan memberikan kontra argumen: Indonesia tidak lagi membutuhkan RSK. Lebih jauh, Indonesia butuh transformasi mendasar untuk masing-masing aktor sektor keamanan secara terpisah. Ada dua ‘akar masalah’ yang menghambat RSK: kelemahan konseptual mendasar serta sentralnya peran masyarakat sipil. Secara keseluruhan, jika RSK yang dimaksud adalah agenda yang dibentuk dan diformulasikan di era tahun 2000-an, maka Indonesia tidak lagi butuh RSK. Tentu ini bukan berarti bahwa semua aktor keamanan Indonesia sudah ‘sempurna’. Justru sebaliknya, RSK perlu ditinggalkan secara konseptual agar kita bisa fokus pada transformasi—bukan sekedar reformasi—fundamental masing masing aktor keamanan.
2019. “Political violence and counter-terrorism: disputed boundaries of a post-colonial state”, in Non-Western Responses to Terrorism, Michael J. Boyle. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019, pp. 128-149 (with Michael E. Newell)
Abstract:
This chapter seeks to describe how Indonesia has dealt with the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. However, beyond merely identifying the country's counterterror policies, the analysis is placed within the broader context of how the state has historically dealt with internal security threats. This chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric of the 'war on terror', Indonesia's counter-terrorism policies are neither a specific response to transnational terror networks, nor simply a by-product of the post-9/11 era. Instead, Indonesia's counter-terrorism policies are entangled with historical state reactions to internal security challenges - ranging from social violence to terrorism and secessionism since the country's independence in 1945. While these different conflicts had diverse political, ideological, religious and territorial characteristics, disputes over the basic institutions and boundaries of the state run as a common thread.
2018. "Why is Southeast Asia Rearming? An Empirical Assessment", in U.S. Policy in Asia -- Perspectives for the Future, eds. Rafiq Dossani and Scott W. Harold (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), pp. 106-137
Abstract:
Why have Southeast Asian states seemed to be rearming over the past decade? Are they improving their defense capabilities to confront a rising China, or are the activities driven by other considerations, such as the need to replace aging equipment? This paper addresses these questions by providing a regional, rather than country-specific, overview of Southeast Asia's defense capability development. Specifically, it presents empirical regional patterns of defense spending, weapons import, and force structure. It examines three existing explanations for Southeast Asia's arms drive: (1) External threat: China’s rising military threat and aggressive behavior, (2) Market economics: the structural dependence on the global defense market, and (3) Technological requirement: Individual armed forces need to replace their aging Cold War–era equipment.
A shortened and summarized version of this chapter appears as "Is Southeast Asia’s Military Modernization Driven by China?" Global Asia, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2018): 42-47
2014. “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force: Trends, Natures, and Drivers,” in Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan. London: Routledge, pp. 175-203
Abstract:
Is Indonesia getting ready to become a regional naval power to balance India, China, and Australia? Why is the navy acquiring state-of-the-art complex platforms; some of which are considered offensive in nature, mightily expensive, and are unsuitable for its day-to-day operations? How do we make sense of the navy's overall force development plans and projections? This chapter seeks to address these questions and explain why and how the Indonesian Navy has been modernizing in recent years the way it has.
2010. Evan A. Laksmana, “Dinamika Politik Militer Indonesia,” in Panduan Media dan Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, eds. Beni Sukadis and Aditya Batara. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute Defense and Strategic Studies and Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, pp. 91 – 111
Abstrak:
Masih relevankah bicara politik militer di era demokrasi? Bagaimana militer mereposisi dirinya setelah lebih dari tiga dekade menjadi bagian dari rezim Orde Baru? Sukseskah reformasi militer kita selama ini? Apakah TNI kini telah menjadi tentara profesional yang melepaskan karakter politik dan niaganya? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini tentu muncul manakala kita disodori persoalan politik militer di Indonesia. Berbagai pertanyaan ini juga tentunya bukan persoalan baru. Banyak tinta telah tertumpah dalam usaha menjelaskan dan menjawab berbagai persoalan seputar politik militer dan hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia selama lebih dari lima dekade. Namun kenyataannya, terlepas dari perkembangan di dunia akademis, persoalan politik militer masih menjadi “persoalan nyata” yang menghadapi keseharian kita
Working papers
2013. "Containing spoilers: Civil-military relations and third parties in the post-Suharto Aceh peace initiatives", Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 25 (Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013)
Abstract:
This paper seeks to explain why and how the Humanitarian Pause and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) broke down, while the Helsinki rounds succeeded in bringing about a permanent negotiated peace in Indonesia. It develops a theoretical model based on the presence of peace spoilers and their ability to derail the process, and submits that discordant civil-military relations and a weak third party incapable of resolving credible commitment problems increase the probability of the government’s armed forces emerging as a peace spoiler. On applying the model while examining the post-Suharto peace initiatives in Aceh, it demonstrates how the weakness of the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) and the discordant state of civil-military relations under Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Sukarnoputri led to the failure of the Humanitarian Pause and COHA while the strength and credibility of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the concordant state of civil-military relations under President Yudhoyono accounted for the success of the Helsinki rounds.
2011. "Climate Insecurities in Indonesia: Implications and Challenges for Defence Transformation", Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 16 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies).
Abstract:
This paper seeks to identify and assess key climate insecurities in Indonesia and further explore how they could potentially influence the process of defence reform that has been ongoing in Indonesia since Suharto’s downfall in 1998. Key climate insecurities in Indonesia are related to energy and food security, large-scale disasters, drought, changing climate patterns and rising sea levels. Furthermore, this paper argues that given these security implications, the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) has yet to seriously assess and incorporate climate change into its force development plans. Finally, this paper outlines some of the key challenges and prospects for TNI’s defence reform process, as it relates to climate change.
2011. "Stirring from Beyond the Borders? American Military Assistance and Defense Reform in Indonesia", Asia Centre Southeast Asia Observatory Study
Abstract
This paper seeks to assess and consider the security component of the new security re-engagement between the United States and Indonesia, especially those pertaining to military assistance to the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Specifically, it seeks to address two broad questions: (1) why the US chose to engage the TNI using military assistance they way they have in recent years, and (2) given the context of Indonesia’s ongoing defense reform process, whether US military assistance would assist the process and how. In addressing these questions, this paper will review US military assistance programs in general and to Indonesia in particular. It will also assess the trends and challenges facing US military assistance in terms of instilling democratic civil-military relations and improving Indonesia’s defense reform.
*Reviewed by Australia Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist
2009. Evan A. Laksmana, “The Preponderance of Geography: Revisiting American Grand Strategy in Asia,” Working Paper No. 1 (Bangkok: American Studies Program, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University)
Abstract:
In this paper, I offer a plausibility probe of how geography—specifically, geo-strategy or the geographical considerations of military policy and strategy—continues to shape U.S. grand strategy in Asia. I also argue that such geographical preponderance is mainly caused by the institutionalization of geography in American grand strategy making, and the increasing role of military officers, specifically Regional Combatant Commanders (previously known as regional CINCs), in foreign policy making and execution. These arguments will then be applied to revisit American grand strategy in Asia.
2008. "Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia" RSIS Working Paper No. 161 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies)
Abstract:
This paper tries to explain the political behaviour of military organizations within the context of civil-military relations. The key purpose is to extract several key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries and political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct cases of political behaviours of the Indonesian military in its relations with the president. This paper aims to answer why these distinct behaviours occur, how they came about, and under what conditions would they be observed. This paper finds that the political behaviours of military organizations can be at least typologized into four distinct categories that depart from the traditional literature: regime spoiler, critical regime partner, uncritical regime partner, and regime pawn. This paper also finds that several variables could help explain such behaviours. First, internal military variables: the military’s self-conception and portrayal of the “national interests”; the degree of military unity and cohesion; and the institutional and individual interests of the key military leadership. Second, variables within the political leadership: the degree of civilian interference in internal military affairs, civilian strength vis-à-vis the military, and civilian handling of the domestic political condition. However, how all these variables interact, the degree of significance of each variable, and how they shape the military’s political behaviour would eventually have to depend on the national political, economic, security and social conditions of the specific time of the case at hand.